
FEATURES
From
Religious Leaders to Ordinary Citizens
The Changing Role of "Sadah" in Yemen
By Mohammed Al-Asadi

Yemen
has a complicated social makeup, yet it is largely harmonious and homogeneous.
And while the tribe today seems to represent the head and heart of society, this
has not always been the case. Other social factions, generally lying outside of
the tribe, have also played a historical role—perhaps more in the past than
today.
One
very significant social faction in Yemen is the sayyids, as described by British
historian Paul Dresch, or sadah, as they are more generally known—the
descendants of the Prophet.
Although
sadah are sometimes also referred to as Hashemites, the term Hashemite can be
applied to all descendants of Hashem bin Abdul-Mutaleb, grandfather of the
Prophet. Sadah, in this report, are the descendants of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib,
husband of the Prophet's daughter.
Researchers
can't find much about the sayyids or sadah in history books and tribal
references. The obvious reason is that they come from different families and
different places, though they are now integrated into society and can be seen
almost in all parts of the country. The available sources just describe the
chronological regimes in Yemen that include the royal family of sayyids.
They
are, in terms of religious practice, Sunnis, Shiites and Sufis. Though they are
incorporated in the Yemeni social structure and form an important brick of that
structure, they still maintain their independent character and specializations.
Roots
and destinies
The
origins of the sayyids were summarized by Dr. Paul Driesch in his book A History
of Modern Yemen.
"The
areas around Sana'a and northwards for centuries were dominated by Zaidi (Shi'ite)
Imams. The crux of Zaidism was that legitimate rule descends through the
Prophet's line, of his daughter Fatimah and son-in-law Ali Bin Abi Talib. Such
descendants of the Prophet are usually called sayyids (also sometimes sharifs;
or sadah or 'Alawis, after Ali Bin Abu Talib). Their venture in the northern
part of Yemen was launched in AD 896 around Saada by the first Imam, Al-Hadi,
and on occasion they had ruled enormous areas, Imams being of the sword as well
as of the book and righteousness: the Qasimis in the seventeenth century had
briefly held most of Yemen (even Hadhramout for some years), and certain earlier
Imams less enamored of state forms had also been conquerors. The sayyids were
important further south too, especially in Hadhramout. There the sayyid presence
was established in AD 952 by a migrant from Iraq named Ahmad Isa, but the
venture he began was very different from that in the far north and the Shafi'i
(Sunni) style of Islam, unlike the Zaidi, launched no great bids for power:
Sayyid influence was local, often built around mediation and sacred tombs,
although family connections and connections of learning reached beyond
particular towns or tribes."
The
sayyid faction went on to play a major role in modern Yemen, explains Dresch.
"Sayyids
(descendants of the Prophet), claimed everywhere a certain precedence,"
according to Dresch. "In the South there were also mashayikh, religious
families of a different descent, and in the North families of qadhis (non-sayyid
‘judges’) were as prominent. Everywhere one found ‘weak’ people who
lacked either tribal or religious honor and whose men were not permitted to bear
arms: some were share-croppers, some were artisans, and others (the lowest of
the low) were butchers, messengers and sweepers. People despite, their poverty,
owned slaves."
Even
if individual sayyids were materially poor, they were able to claim social
equality with wealthy and prominent sheikhs by virtue of their distinguished
ancestry.
"The
position of the sayyids—descendants of the Prophet and themselves rather
specialists in descent, for they maintained broad, detailed genealogies of a
kind no-one else did—was ambiguous nearly everywhere in Yemen: Some were poor,
some were rich, some were learned and others not. They were scarcely a class in
the modern sense. But generally they exacted a degree of respect and they
refused to have their women marry non-sayyids… In the North, at about 1915,
the rise to power of Imam Yahya (himself, of course, a sayyid) gave many sayyid
families a stake in what emerged as a dawlah—a state, and then dynasty, which
far outweighed the little dawlah of South Yemen, and claimed a place of its own
on the world map."
An
Imam must be a Sayyid
Only
a sayyid could be an Imam, as he would have to take on the role of the Caliph in
lieu of the Prophet. However, according to Zaidi beliefs, not any sayyid can be
an Imam, according to journalist Mohammed Al-Kibsi, himself a sayyid.
"The
Imam should be an ‘Alawi, derived from Ali; Fatimi, derived from Fatima; and
Husseini, derived from the eldest son of Ali and Fatima," explains Al-Kibsi.
"In Zaidism, descendants of Hassan bin Ali bin Abu Taleb, brother of
Hussein, are not eligible for the imamate, because Hassan did not fight against
the rebels who took the caliphate from him."
Therefore,
Hashemites too are ineligible to become Imams, at least in Yemen, as they do not
fit the Zaidis' criteria as sayyids, even though they are considered descendents
of the Prophet.
This
distinction explains how the sayyids were able to claim the political power and
influence which endured in North Yemen into recent times.
One
of the last great Imams was Imam Yehya Hamid Al-Din, who was leader of Zaidism
from 1904 until being killed in a 1948 coup attempt.
Yemeni
anthropologist and historian Ibrahim Al-Maqhafi, in his Dictionary of Yemeni
Land and Tribes Part I, attributed the Hamid Al-Din family to their closest
ancestors, Sharaf Al-Din, who have been living in Kawkaban, to the northwest of
Sana’a, for centuries. Many of the Sharaf Al-Dins' ancestors had lived in
Rayda, central Yemen. Al-Maqhafi described the family name as judges and Imams
who ruled Yemen for centuries.
For
a family that effectively ruled Yemen for centuries, this description falls far
short, and for predictable reasons. In actual fact, the house of Hamid Al-Din is
not fondly remembered in modern Yemen, as the current republican regime was
founded on the ashes of Imamic rule following the 1962 revolution.
Although
the present government may try to play down the traditional power of the sayyids,
there is no denying that they were de facto nobility and played a central role
in much of Yemen's history, often wielding a power and influence exceeding that
of tribes and sheikhs. Moreover the majority of ordinary people historically
recognized their claims to rule Yemen—a claim bolstered by their repeated
invocation of their descent from the Prophet himself.
Although
the sayyids' claims to secular power carried great weight in the past amongst
simple and illiterate peasants and tribesmen, few Yemenis today are impressed by
their claims to be the rightful rulers of Yemen.
Despite
their dwindling stock of inherited dignity, many sayyids today still cling to
their historic claims. Contemporary sayyids still regard themselves as superior
to run-of-the-mill Yemenis and will often refuse to let their women marry men
from non-sayyid families to preserve the purity of their blood. On the other
hand, male sayyids are free to marry women of any class, apart from servants.
The
1962 Revolution signaled the end of the political pretensions of the sayyids.
Following the creation of the Republic of Yemen, many prominent Zaidi and sayyid
families opted to leave political life, or even to leave the country.
One
striking aspect today is that while the sayyids descend from one common ancestor
(Imam Ali) or Hashim in the wider sense, they are identified by their closest
ancestors: in terms of family names, sayyids can be any of the following: Al-Mutawakil,
Al-Moshaki, Abu Talib, Al-Mansour, Al-Kibsi, Al-Khazzan, Ghamdhan, Al-Ahdal, Al-Hashimi,
Al-Saqqaf, Al-Siragi, Fa'ei, Zabarah, Sharaf Al-Din, Hamid Al-Din, Al-Qasimi,
Al-Shami, or Al-Wazir. Many sayyids today are also named after their places of
origin, for example Al-Sayyani, Al-Zabidi, Al-Hothi, and so on. You need to be
clever to identify those non-sayyids who carry the same family or place name.
Life
in a sayyid community
Although
most historians focus on the role of the Zaidi sayyids who live in Sana'a and
the northern towns, the Sunni sayyids are often overlooked.
One
of the most important groups of Sunni sayyids hail from the scholarly Islamic
town of Zabid in the Tihama; they have since settled in the mid-highlands of
Taiz, Ibb and the western regions of Dhamar.
"More
than 150 years ago, our ancestors moved from Zabid to this place," sayyid
Abdul-Jalil Al-Ahdal told the Observer. "We were told by our fathers and
grandfathers that they came to here to educate people."
Al-Ahdal
now lives with over 700 people of sayyid descent in the village of Al-Ramadi in
Al-Udain, Ibb. This village used to be a place where all elements of Yemeni
society—sayyids, tribesmen, Jews, akhdam and mazayinah—co-existed in
peaceful harmony.
Today,
sayyids represent about one third of the village's population. The well-educated
sayyids first came to the village centuries ago as teachers, preachers, and
doctors using traditional herbal medicines, and were welcomed gratefully by the
illiterate villagers.
Although
these sayyids in Al-Ramadi were Sunnis, they still retained some of the
aloofness of their Zaidi cousins further north.
In
particular, the sayyids reveled in their unique position as descendants of the
Prophet. The children of ordinary villagers learned to welcome being beaten up
by sayyid children recalls this reporter, a non-sayyid who grew up in the
village.
This
hierarchy also had to be respected by older villagers. Even as adults, the
villagers would compete to receive a big punch on their chests or backs from the
[holy] hand of the Grand Sayyid, who used to live in a secluded house attached
to the mosque. Despite this, the Grand Sayyid was appreciated by all who knew
him, because he was like a just and welcoming father to everybody around.
As
is the case elsewhere, many sayyids were poor; some were rich; some were learned
and others not. They didn't own property or lands. Houses were granted to them
by the actual residents. They used to live solely on endowments and gifts.
In
Al-Ramadi, the sayyids also upheld the tradition of refusing to have their women
(sharifah) marry any ordinary citizen, even a high-ranking dignitary. Once a big
argument broke out when a respected judge courted a sayyid girl with the consent
of the bride and her parents. The rest of her family did not approve, and the
extended clan camped around the house to stop the perceived insult to the sayyid
family. In this instance they did not succeed, despite causing a furor that was
heard throughout the directorate. The couple married in secret and left the
village to live in an unknown place.
After
this, no other sayyid in the village, at least in recent memory, has dared to
marry beneath themselves. This attitude is still in effect, and other people in
the area accept it.
Mohammed
Al-Kibsi told the Observer that he once heard his grandfather, who was a judge
in Hajjah, telling this story:
"My
grandfather said that when Imam Al-Hadi first came to Yemen, he saw that most of
the tribespeople were illiterate shepherds. He instructed his cousins not to
marry illiterate or ignorant people. He then kept marrying sharifat (plural of
sharifa, female sayyids) to sadah," said Al-Kibsi.
"All
sadah do the same thing, and never allow non-family members to marry their
daughters."
However,
in modern, urban areas many sayyids have entirely abandoned these traditional
practices. Judges and dignitaries among the sadah often marry their daughters to
sons of sheikhs and to educated non-sayyids, says Al-Kibsi.
This
change in attitude is attributed to the growing level of education across
society, and the need to forge new family connections across these ancient
social boundaries and class distinctions.
In
the past, it was seen as a shame and highly unusual to see a sayyid as a
craftsman, and impossible to see him as a singer. But times are changing, and
today most prominent singers and actors are sadah.
The
ancient political role of the sayyids recently returned to the public
consciousness during last year's rebellion in Saada. But while the government
tried to stoke fears of a return to the bad old days of the Imamate, the failure
of Hussein Badruddin Al-Hothi's revolt only emphasized the declining influence
and prestige of the sayyids, and underlined that today, most sayyids are
indistinguishable from the other members of Yemen's varied society.


Mr. Mohamed Al-Asadi is the Managing Editor of Yemen Observer (www.yobserver.com).
He is also an International Correspondent for The Ambassadors Magazine. His
email is alasadi@yobserver.com.